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In the current political climate, the Indonesian media is able to report openly on a range of 
previously taboo political issues (Sen & Hill, 2000; Kakiailatu, 2007; Tapsell, 2010). One issue 
that garners substantial attention is that of corruption. In stark contrast to the limited media 
reporting on corruption prior to 1998, it has been a stalwart issue for the press since the 
Reformation era (1998–), dominating both print and television media. This paper explores how 
corruption has been portrayed in the media, concluding that there is a clear tendency towards 
a ‘politics-as-entertainment’ depiction of corruption cases, as evidenced by the inclination 
towards ‘scandalising’ the issue. This paper argues that this format of reporting has broad 
implications for the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia because it trivialises a key political 
issue and can ultimately discourage meaningful public debate and engagement with the anti-
corruption movement.
In the current political climate, the Indone-sian media is able to report openly on a range of previously taboo political issues (Sen & 
Hill, 2000; Kakiailatu, 2007; Tapsell, 2010). One 
issue that garners substantial attention is that of 
corruption. In stark contrast to the limited media 
reporting on corruption prior to 1998, it has been 
a stalwart issue for the press since the Reformation 
era (1998–), dominating both print and television 
media. The increase in media attention has been 
driven by two main factors. First, following 1998, 
there were changes in legislation that subsequently 
increased media freedom. Indonesia’s Media Bill 
was redrafted in 1999 during the Habibie Presi-
dency, terminating the watchdog activities of the 
Ministry of Information, which had previously 
served as a proxy mechanism for censorship (Sen 
& Hill, 2000, p. 7; Anwar, 2010). With these new 
laws, Indonesia’s media became one of the freest 
in Asia (Anwar, 2010). Second, following 1998 
there was a widespread proliferation of new me-
dia outlets, resulting in an increase in the absolute 
number of newspapers, television and radio sta-
tions and online news websites, inevitably leading 
61  WHEN NEWS BECOMES ENTERTAINMENT
to an increased quantity and availability of infor-
mation.
The desire to report openly on corruption 
has become almost an obsession in Indonesia fol-
lowing decades of media censorship on the issue. 
The reason for this is twofold: it is the assertion 
of a commitment to holding those in politics ac-
countable to the public and it forces improved 
transparency of the government. The media plays 
a key role in informing the public about political 
issues and providing information required by the 
general population so that they can make sound 
decisions and participate more meaningfully in 
the democratic process (Balkin, 1999; Street, 
2001); therefore, it functions as a key mechanism 
for promoting political transparency and account-
ability. Moreover, the public appear intrigued with 
the corruption scandals that emerge, demanding 
more news on corruption while the media fuels 
this interest with provocative stories highlighting 
the scandalous nature of corruption cases.
In Indonesia, a broad spectrum of reporting 
styles exists, but the tendency towards report-
ing corruption as sensationalised political scan-
dal is increasingly apparent (Margana, 2009). 
Front-page articles with dramatic headlines and 
paparazzi-style photographs charting the latest 
evidence and speculation as they emerge, are now 
commonplace.1 Such reporting is a double-edged 
sword: it increases public awareness of corruption 
cases and the figures involved, but it also risks triv-
ialising them in favour of overstated coverage that 
emphasises the dramatic elements of the cases 
rather than the underlying institutional and sys-
temic causes of Indonesia’s ‘culture of corruption’.
This paper explores the nature of corruption 
reporting in Indonesia, drawing upon key corrup-
tion scandals that captured the media (and the na-
tion’s) attention in 2011–2012. It argues that media 
coverage of corruption issues has erred towards a 
‘politics-as-entertainment’ format to attract read-
ers and sustain interest in corruption scandals 
as they play out over an extended period of time 
in the political and judicial arenas. To this end, I 
identify three key forms of reporting which aim to 
pique curiosity and intrigue: ‘scandalisation’ (skan-
dalisasi), ‘soap-operafication’ and the reporting of 
banalities. These three modes of reporting play 
into the increasingly dominant trend of ‘politics-
as-entertainment’, which has the potential to influ-
ence public opinion about corruption issues in a 
number of ways. While they generate interest, and 
sometimes even outrage, surrounding corruption 
issues, these modes of reporting are more likely 
to promote knowledge of particular personalities 
and cases rather than encouraging a deeper un-
derstanding of the political and structural reasons 
that underlie much of the corrupt behaviour of In-
donesian public officials.
The Influence of Media on Politics
The influence of the media is normatively ac-
cepted as crucial in shaping public discourse and 
debate. Even though it has no formal authority to 
condemn the behaviour of public officials, a free 
mass media is widely understood to have an obli-
gation to promote good governance and facilitate 
debates about corruption in several ways. These 
include raising public awareness about the causes, 
consequences and possible remedies for corrup-
tion (Rose-Ackerman, 2003, p. 73; Peruzzotti & 
Smulovitz, 2006). Indeed, some view the media 
as being one of the institutions capable of having 
widespread impact upon debates on corruption 
(World Bank, 2011).
More commonly, however, the media is seen 
to play a role in investigating and reporting the 
details of corruption cases as they unfold. These 
types of stories also act as a check on those in 
government, who presumably wish to maintain a 
positive public image in order to further or main-
tain their political careers. The symbolic capital of 
a ‘good reputation’ is something that politicians 
and public officials use to not only gain public sup-
port but also influence political decision-making 
(Sanders & Canel, 2006, p. 457). The potency of 
the media in discrediting politicians and expos-
ing ‘unacceptable’ behaviour gives it unparalleled 
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power in shaping how these individuals are viewed 
by the public. Thus, the media has been identified 
as a core social accountability mechanism within 
democratic systems, providing a continuing check 
on political misconduct in between elections 
(Grimes, 2008, p. 4). As a source of knowledge for 
the public, the media is recognised as a key pillar 
of democracy, often referred to as the ‘fourth es-
tate’, providing information to citizens upon which 
they can form opinions and make decisions relat-
ing to a range of political issues.2
While the media has an important role to 
play in monitoring governments, it is far from a 
panacea when it comes to accountability. There is 
a normative assumption that the media, as a pur-
veyor of information and knowledge, automati-
cally empowers its citizens and promotes trans-
parency. However, this is at best a crude inter-
pretation of a highly complex relationship (Street, 
2001, pp. 231–232), the weaknesses of which are 
exposed by looking more closely at the metaphor 
of transparency itself. Literally, the term transpar-
ency “suggests a medium through which we view 
things” (Balkin, 1999, p. 394), which is conceptu-
ally separate from the ‘object’ being observed and 
which does not substantially alter the nature of the 
object itself. Yet the media is not conceptually sep-
arate from what it reports, as it has a deciding role 
in what is reported and how it is framed. Journal-
ism is a structured activity shaped by sources, the 
publication’s interests and the availability of mate-
rial resources (Street, 2001, p. 152–155). The me-
dia thus creates its own political reality by shaping 
public opinion on the issues on which it reports.
Even if journalists and editors believe that 
they are speaking to an existing audience (or audi-
ences), they are in fact “imagining them and con-
stituting them” (Street, 2001, p. 53). The relation-
ship between media and audience can be viewed 
through the prism of ‘dependency’, where this 
dependency takes a range of forms. Ball-Rokeach 
and De Fleur (1976, p. 6) identified three such de-
pendencies: (a) to understand the world around 
us; (b) to determine ways in which to act mean-
ingfully within that world; and (c) as a form of 
‘fantasy-escape’ from everyday problems. In con-
structing its reporting for a specific audience and 
with a specific ‘dependency’ in mind, the media 
can alter various forms of cognition, feelings and 
behaviour within a specific setting. This concep-
tual framework allows for an assessment of media 
outside of its normatively-held role as an informa-
tion provider. Accessing information provided by 
the media is not necessarily the primary reason 
that people are attracted to news stories: all forms 
of media, not just the tabloid media, embody a 
source of entertainment and potential escapism.
The media represents a powerful vehicle for 
shaping public opinion and consequently is prone 
to elite capture and commercial interests.3 These 
elites can come from within or outside of the 
government. Concerns related to government co-
option stem primarily in situations where freedom 
of the press is limited by government ownership 
of a large proportion of the media, which may be-
come a vehicle for government propaganda and/
or experience censorship (Djankov et al., 2001, 
pp. 2–3). The privatisation of the media is thus, 
on the one hand, promoted as a positive step for 
accountability. On the other hand, however, a pri-
vatised media is not necessarily the remedy for 
this problem, particularly in states where a small, 
wealthy elite class are able to capture the market 
or where the pressures of economic competition 
pit the maximisation of sales against fourth estate 
responsibilities.
Media ownership in Indonesia does reflect a 
level of elite capture, with wealthy business peo-
ple and politicians among the owners of several 
high-profile media conglomerates in the country.4 
For example, Aburizal Bakrie, the current chair-
man of the Golkar political party, owns a number 
of media outlets, both print (Surabaya Post) and 
television (ANTV and TVONE), as well as several 
online media sites. Another prominent example is 
Suryo Palo, who created his own political party, 
Nasdem, in 2010. He also owns the newspaper 
Media Indonesia and television channel MetroTV. 
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Ownership of the media by elites does not appear 
to have resulted in the suppression of reporting on 
corruption issues, indeed, such reporting appears 
to be at an all-time high; however, it does influ-
ence which stories are reported and how they are 
portrayed (Tapsell, 2012). In deciding what cases 
are covered, and the depth with which they are 
covered, elites hope to manipulate public percep-
tions of issues related to their interest, either by 
skimming over negative reports concerning their 
own interests, or by highlighting the weaknesses 
of rivals.
Why Scandal?
Scandals involving politicians or bureaucrats are 
a by-product of a free media, as the freedom to 
report on the private behaviour of public officials 
is often curtailed in cases where the media is re-
stricted by the government (Achter, 2003, p. 65). 
However, the decision to expose and report on a 
scandal is one influenced by more than just the 
ability to do so: just because reporters can report 
on scandals, it does not mean they must do so. The 
reasons for reporting scandals can be considered 
within three broad categories: ethical, political 
and profit-driven. These reasons are not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive; however, one of these rea-
sons often provides the dominant motivation for 
publicising a story.
If we accept the premise that the media—for 
all its limitations—is a crucial component of a 
functioning democracy, it follows that informing 
the public of matters of national interest is a core 
responsibility of journalists. The reporting of po-
litical scandal is often framed in these terms: the 
media have a moral obligation to expose unethical 
behaviour by political figures because the public 
have a right to know how their elected representa-
tives act when representing their interests. The 
media has a long history of exposing improper 
behaviour among public figures, and this infor-
mation can ultimately be used to hold them to 
account, either by forcing resignation and/or by 
spurring prosecution and conviction.5 This tradi-
tion, however, is not easy to maintain. Corrup-
tion cases often involve complex legal, economic 
and financial dimensions, and ‘good’ investigative 
journalism assumes that journalists have the re-
quired legal and financial understanding to be able 
to analyse all aspects of the situation, which is not 
always the case (Ronning, 2009, p. 166). Journal-
ists leave themselves open to defamation suits if 
they are not able to support their accusations with 
evidence. These considerations may ultimately de-
ter the media from reporting certain cases or ac-
cusations, undermining the ethical responsibility 
to provide pertinent political information to the 
public. Consequently, the motivations to report on 
corruption scandals may be driven by other, less 
noble, factors.
Although media scandals are often based on 
exaggeration and sensationalism, they still can 
play a role in raising public awareness (Lull & Hin-
erman, 1997). Scandals that expose unacceptable 
behaviour by public officials (albeit not necessarily 
illegal activity) have implications for both their po-
sition and profile. Scandals are a manifestation of 
the ‘politics of shaming’ that can not only damage 
an individual’s reputation, but also serve as a social 
reminder that despite any legal outcomes, certain 
acts still constitute moral transgressions (Tumber 
& Waisbord, 2004, p. 1145). In cases of corruption 
where evidence can be brought against those ac-
cused, the scandals instigated by the media may 
potentially have tangible legal ramifications in-
cluding investigations and/or convictions.
More fundamentally, the reporting of scan-
dals raises deeper questions about a person’s 
moral integrity. Even if the person has not been 
found to have committed a crime, they may still 
be perceived to have transgressed social norms 
reflecting dominant conceptions of morality—
what personal behaviour is acceptable versus what 
is unacceptable (Tumber and Waisbord, 2004, p. 
1146). In this way, the reporting of scandals can 
open the door for public discussion about morals 
and values, stimulating debate about and public 
interest in the basic principles that underpin how 
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politicians act as individuals.
Reporting on political scandals may also be 
driven by competing political interests. The me-
dia is built upon links, networks and relationships 
that may sometimes blur the line between who 
is ‘inside’ and who is ‘outside’ (Ronning, 2009, p. 
167). The interests of media organisations, busi-
nesses and politicians have the potential to blur, 
which can influence decisions about what stories 
to include and omit, what issues to report on and 
whose names to mention. The media is not apoliti-
cal, and personal, business and political relation-
ships can influence reporting just as strongly as 
investigative journalism and ethics. In the politi-
cal arena, the media can also be used as a tool for 
discrediting other politicians or parties. The expo-
sure of certain ‘unacceptable’ behaviour may have 
follow-on benefits for other elites such as rival 
politicians or those with connected business inter-
ests. Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991, p. 88) contend 
that this kind of coverage is focused upon discred-
iting opposition rather than confronting corrup-
tion issues in any meaningful way. Reports of cor-
ruption scandals, particularly the targets of such 
reports and the intensity of the scrutiny, can thus 
be engineered to meet these political interests if 
media outlets or journalists have political links to 
specific parties.
Scandals for Profit
In the case of Indonesia, the trend towards the 
‘scandalisation’ of corruption cases does represent 
a desire to increase audience numbers and there-
fore profits (personal communication with Igna-
tius Haryanto, 3 February 2012). This has a pro-
found impact upon dominant media narratives.6 
As a result, the media is now increasingly directed 
towards influencing consumers of the private 
sphere and less directed towards serving the needs 
of public citizens. This influences both the stories 
reported and the quality of reporting: corruption 
cases are portrayed in a dramatic fashion with a fo-
cus upon intriguing key players rather than on un-
derlying structural reasons supporting corruption. 
If profit-making is the primary raison d’etre for a 
media outlet, the timely breaking of stories that 
capture public attention may be prioritised over 
thorough fact-checking, unbiased reporting and 
an overall commitment to quality journalism, side-
lining the fourth estate role of providing news for 
the benefit of informing and educating the public 
(Tumber & Waisbord, 2004, pp. 1144–1145). The 
competing interests of democratic responsibilities 
and profit-making represent a dilemma for media 
outlets, which need to formulate their own priori-
ties in relation to this nexus.
So why would a media group choose to focus 
on scandals? Aside from any political advantages 
the reporting of corruption may hold, scandals 
themselves are also a profitable genre of news 
(Tumber & Waisbord, 2004, p. 1147).7 Some au-
thors argue that scandal appeals to an innate hu-
man characteristic, identified by the German con-
cept of schadenfreude—taking pleasure in the mis-
fortune of others. However, there is debate about 
the extent to which this can adequately explain the 
popularity of reporting on scandal (Thompson, 
2000; Achter, 2003, p. 67). Other authors identify 
the essential function of scandal as revealing the 
humanity and human frailty of others, “to strip off 
the impersonal masks donned by those in author-
ity” (Moodie, 1990, p. 881). Whatever the reason, 
scandals sell, and the rise of ‘politics-as-enter-
tainment’ as a format for reporting is reflected in 
the increasing popularity of sensationalised news 
coverage. As competition between media outlets 
increases, scandals that attract public interest are 
used as a means to stimulate audience numbers, 
subsequently boosting corporate profits.
As the line between news and entertainment 
is increasingly blurred, reporting on scandals be-
comes less about informing citizens for the public 
good and increasingly about catching and retain-
ing their attention as consumers. In their assess-
ment of the influence of the Clinton-Lewinsky 
scandal in the United States, Carpini and Williams 
(2001, p. 178) argue that national politics “has been 
reduced to a sometimes amusing, sometimes mel-
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odramatic, but seldom relevant spectator sport” 
and diverts the attention of the government and 
the public away from more substantive issues. The 
rise of ‘politics-as-entertainment’ is also danger-
ous because media scandals are designed to pique 
and retain interest and do not necessarily lead to 
truth, revelations or depth of coverage (Balkin, 
1999, p. 407; Street, 2001, pp. 44–45). If the me-
dia’s focus is on generating interest and not on the 
reporting of ‘truth’, then it is no longer fulfilling its 
public interest role and meeting the expectations 
of its function as the fourth estate.
The changing media landscape has also put 
pressure on media outlets to produce 24-hour 
coverage of breaking scandals. The urgency to 
‘produce’ news can lead to a disregard for journal-
istic practices, as media outlets scramble to ‘scoop’ 
their competitors. Moreover, the 24-hour news 
cycle puts pressure on journalists to find new an-
gles for stories (Tumber & Waisbord, 2004), which 
can result in the reporting of ‘banalities’ merely in 
order to keep a story in the spotlight.8 This focus 
on breadth, as opposed to depth, has also led to 
an incessant need for political commentary, with 
scrutiny resembling that of the paparazzi rather 
than hard-hitting investigative journalism aiming 
to uncover the root of the case. Instead of report-
ing purely on facts, coverage tends to frame po-
litical scandals as soap operas or even situational 
comedies (depending on the nature of the scandal 
at hand), encouraging sensationalism and specu-
lation, which serves to extend the shelf life of a 
particular story. Coverage of political corruption 
within the media in Indonesia is voyaging into this 
territory.
Media, Corruption and the Case of 
Indonesia
Prior to the New Order (1966–1998), the Indone-
sian media had a history of reporting on corrup-
tion issues.9 Concern over the number of corrupt 
colonial officials emerged during the latter years 
of the Dutch colonial regime (Wertheim, 1963). 
In the early Sukarno period, corruption featured 
as a key political issue, and was widely reported 
in Indonesia’s newspapers, with several Minis-
ters and bureaucrats being accused of corruption, 
even though the number of criminal convictions 
remained low (Setiyono et al., 2012). Anti-corrup-
tion reporting was much more subdued during the 
New Order, alternately being suppressed and co-
opted by the government for political gain (Smith, 
1971, pp. 437–439; Margana, 2009). During the 
Reformation era, the focus on particular cases has 
waxed and waned, but corruption has been a dom-
inant theme that shows no sign of fading.
Incidences of corruption from the national, 
regional and local levels were frequently reported 
in the media in the twelve months between mid-
2011 and mid-2012. However, the media focused 
most intensely on issues that emerged as a result 
of the conjecture and discussion surrounding the 
appointment of a new head for Indonesia’s Cor-
ruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pem-
berantasan Korupsi, KPK) in December 2011. 
With the anticipation of the appointment of a new 
KPK chief, media coverage focused on three par-
ticular corruption cases that had been identified 
as priority cases for the KPK.10 The first of these 
was ‘Centurygate’, the case in which the govern-
ment approved a Rp. 6.7 trillion bailout package 
under suspicious circumstances for the privately-
owned Bank Century. The bailout package was al-
legedly a far larger sum than required and there 
are indications that a substantial proportion was 
siphoned off and channelled towards other politi-
cal interests, including political campaigns.11 The 
second of the cases was the Wisma Atlet scandal 
that emerged out of construction contracts for the 
Southeast Asian (SEA) Games held in Jakarta and 
Palembang during 2011. Members of the House of 
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) 
were accused of accepting bribes in return for fa-
vouring certain contractors in the procurement 
process for the games. Though several key mem-
ber of the Democrat Party have been implicated 
in the scandal, the majority of media attention 
has focused upon former beauty queen-turned-
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politician Angelina Sondakh. The third was the 
Cek Pelawat scandal in which Nunun Nurbaeti 
was accused of distributing approximately Rp. 
20.65 billion to members of the DPR in return for 
the appointment of Miranda Goeltom as deputy 
chairperson of the Bank of Indonesia. Media re-
ports about each of these scandals abounded, 
closely following new developments and the lives 
of the key corruption figures involved. Even before 
being resolved, the scandals had taken their toll 
upon public opinions of corruption and the gov-
ernment.
The portrayal of these three corruption cases 
during the case study period was diverse; however, 
through an analysis of newspaper, magazine, and 
television coverage, there were discernible trends 
in how they were reported Scandals naturally lend 
themselves to reporting genres that draw on sen-
sationalism, soap-operafication and banality, all of 
which are apparent in the Indonesian media’s cov-
erage of these cases. Sensationalism relates to the 
ability of media coverage to use presentation, con-
tent and language to attract attention and provoke 
an emotional response (Vettehen et al., 2005). It 
can manifest itself in several ways, for example the 
placement of the news story on the front page of 
a newspaper or running it as the primary breaking 
news report on television, particularly if the topic 
is not necessarily a new one. The use of images, 
including title font, photographs, graphics and 
even bright colours also attracts audience atten-
tion. Articles about Angelina Sondakh and Nunun 
Nurbaeti were commonly accompanied by photo-
graphs of the women. Television coverage featured 
camera shots following the corruptors as they ar-
rived at the airport in Jakarta (as with the case of 
Nunun), as they arrived at and left the KPK, or 
during other public outings. The images often had 
a paparazzi-like quality, resembling images one 
might expect to find in a gossip magazine.
The primary aim of sensationalised reporting 
is to pique interest rather than to inform. Reports 
about the extravagant lifestyles of those accused of 
corruption are a prime example, contrasting the 
rich, immoral corruptors with the honest, hard-
working average Indonesian. Having fled the coun-
try, Nunun was recognised while out shopping in 
Bangkok and subsequently extradited to Indonesia 
in December 2011. By emphasising the circum-
stances around her arrest, the media highlighted 
that she had been living a life of luxury while in 
hiding from Indonesian authorities.12 In the case 
of Angelina Sondakh, referred to affectionately 
as ‘Angie’ by the Indonesian press, the corruption 
suspect is presented as a beautiful woman with a 
tragic family history and a bright young recruit for 
the Democrat Party.13 Her fall from grace through 
her embroilment in the Wisma Atlet scandal is 
used to exemplify the ultimate moral transgres-
sion: someone who had it all but still put selfish 
interests ahead of the public good. This form of 
sensationalism aims to provoke a strong emotion-
al response that will compel readers to follow the 
case with more interest in future.
The term ‘soap operafication’ describes the 
inclination to portray scandals as unfolding dra-
mas with lead characters, both on the side of good 
and evil. As the soap opera begins, the lead char-
acters and their support cast are introduced, with 
other actors entering the show as the story pro-
ceeds, and the audience is made familiar with all 
aspects of their personal and political life. Along-
side the establishment of these characters, we are 
introduced to the broad premise of the drama, 
though we do not know all the details. The mys-
tery follows the key actors through the soap op-
era, with the ultimate goal of determining whether 
these characters are indeed guilty of corruption. 
This form of reporting draws upon human curios-
ity and voyeurism, exemplified by the popularity 
of tabloid reporting and paparazzi journalism.
The Cek Pelawat scandal, in which parlia-
mentarians were bribed to support the election 
of Miranda Goeltom as deputy head of the Bank 
of Indonesia, lends itself particularly well to this 
style of reporting because several key aspects of 
the case remain unexplained. First, the motivation 
for Nunun in becoming embroiled in the distri-
67  WHEN NEWS BECOMES ENTERTAINMENT
bution of money to DPR members was unclear. 
Nunun had no direct political link to Miranda 
Goeltom, nor did it appear that they had close 
personal relationship (although photographic evi-
dence did eventually emerge indicating that they 
had previously met at social functions). This im-
plies that Nunun was working on behalf of another 
party, whose identity was unknown. Second, the 
source of the funding was a mystery: who would 
have an interest in ensuring that Miranda Goel-
tom was elected? Third, Miranda herself denied 
any knowledge of the transactions, despite the fact 
that witnesses attested that they had been paid 
off in return for supporting her appointment as 
Vice-President of the Bank of Indonesia. Miran-
da refused to acknowledge any culpability in the 
payments, which challenged the very basis of the 
bribery case. Finally, like all good soap operas, this 
case also included what was ostensibly a case of 
amnesia. Nunun’s ability to recall details was alleg-
edly inhibited by a serious brain affliction, limit-
ing her memory and ability to recall details. This 
prompted the KPK to order independent medical 
tests in an effort to refute the assertion she could 
not be called as a witness in the court proceedings 
related to this case.14 Media coverage of the events 
speculated upon each of these enigmas in head-
lines, opinions pieces, readers’ letters and through 
cartoons, fuelling the conversion of politics into a 
form of entertainment.
A development in the Centurygate scandal 
also demonstrates the emphasis on drama in media 
coverage of the case. In August 2012, former KPK 
chief Antasari Azhar, in prison for complicity in 
a murder, alleged that Indonesian president Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and a number of other high 
profile officials met in October 2008 to discuss the 
legal ramifications of the Bank Century bailout. 
Antasari accused the President of personally ap-
proving the bailout plan, in direct contradiction to 
statements from the President himself that he was 
not involved in the decision. While these allega-
tions themselves are unsubstantiated, the ensuing 
media coverage has the hallmarks of soap-oper-
afied reporting. The President, Yudhoyono, is the 
main character in the drama, with Antasari Azhar 
playing his adversary. The mystery to be uncov-
ered is who is lying and who is telling the truth. 
To this end, a high-profile supporting cast has also 
been brought in, such as Hatta Rajasa, coordinat-
ing minister for the economy and leader of the 
Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, 
PAN) political party, and Denny Indrayana, the 
deputy minister for law and human rights. Both 
were supposedly in attendance at the meeting and 
issued press statements to the effect that a meet-
ing did occur but there was no discussion of the 
Bank Century bailout.15 The ensuing speculation 
is typified in an article in online news site, Tempo 
Interaktif (10 August 2012), which ventured that 
the swift denial by the President was indicative of 
deeper concerns: “Oddly enough, the President 
seemed to feel the need to reinforce the denial. It 
creates the sense that the issue is very worrying 
for the President”. The analysis of the President’s 
response and the extrapolation that it implies guilt 
stimulated further development of the narrative 
from a different angle, providing a new direction 
in which the soap opera can progress, and room 
for further speculation on who was involved and 
who knew what in relation to the case.
A third aspect of scandal reporting in the In-
donesian media is its focus on banalities—namely 
the reporting of news on corruptors that is neither 
central to the case nor relevant to understanding 
the underlying motives for corruption—through 
in-depth coverage of trivial aspects of the corrup-
tors’ lives that are unrelated to the charges they 
face. The focus on Angelina Sondakh’s personal 
life, including accusations that she had an affair 
with her late husband’s brother and persistent 
coverage of her relationship with a former KPK 
investigator, are more akin to gossip and tabloid 
reporting than hard-hitting journalism. For exam-
ple, an article in the Jakarta Globe (26 July 2012) 
ran the headline ‘Angelina asks boyfriend to visit 
late husband’s grave with children’; it reported that 
Angelina had asked her boyfriend to visit her late 
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husband’s grave with her children for Idul Fitri 
while she was in detention—a story that had no 
relevance to the corruption charges Angelina was 
facing and no obvious public interest value. This 
genre of reporting, focusing on the minutiae of 
Angelina’s private life, draws upon public curiosity 
about her personal activities rather than the im-
plications of her actions as a lawmaker and parlia-
mentarian who has allegedly acted against public 
interest by accepting bribes.
Another example of such reporting was the 
keen media interest in the conditions of detention 
for Nunun Nurbaeti in the Cek Pelawat case,. One 
example of this reporting was provided by Seputar 
Indonesia entitled ‘Nunun is without special facili-
ties’ on 12 December 2011, following her transfer 
to Pondok Bambu gaol in East Jakarta. This par-
ticular article occupied almost two pages of the 
newspaper, with large photographs of the room, 
other inmates and the front gate of the prison, as 
well as brief details on what she was being fed and 
her anticipated daily routine. It did not include 
any reference to a statement from Nunun about 
her new living conditions, or a discussion of the 
significance of her detention. While Seputar Indo-
nesia may have scooped its competitors, this new 
information was far from pertinent to the serious 
issue of corruption.
These three modes of reporting—scandali-
sation, soap-operafication, and the reporting of 
banalities—play into the increasingly dominant 
trend of ‘politics-as-entertainment’, which has the 
potential to influence public opinion about cor-
ruption issues in a number of ways. While they 
generate interest in corruption issues, and some-
times even outrage, they are more likely to pro-
mote knowledge of particular personalities and 
cases rather than deeper understandings of the 
political and structural reason that underlie much 
of the corrupt behaviour by public officials.
Implications
The pervasive coverage of corruption issues in 
Indonesia’s media has one clear outcome: the 
prominence of corruption in the government is 
thoroughly underscored for the Indonesian pub-
lic. What is less straightforward are the potential 
impacts of the reporting trends, the sensational-
ism of cases and the focus on banalities on popular 
attitudes towards anti-corruption efforts and the 
movement as a whole. The positive effects of the 
media coverage are, put simply, increased public 
awareness of the problem through the broadcast-
ing of case progression, public statements by those 
in power and condemnations of corruption. Sev-
eral scholars and institutions propose that with-
out widespread social support, governance and 
anti-corruption reforms will have little success (for 
some examples see Galtung, 1998; Johnston, 1998, 
p. 124; USAID, 2010; World Bank, 2011). Howev-
er, as Danang J. Widyoko of Indonesian Corrup-
tion Watch (ICW) notes, the majority of Indone-
sia’s anti-corruption activists are well-educated, 
middle-class citizens, and thus the question for 
the movement becomes how to engage ‘ordinary’ 
Indonesians (personal communication, 20 January 
2012). Consequently, the impacts of media cover-
age upon public perceptions of corruption take on 
a key significance, particularly as combating cor-
ruption is continually highlighted as a key political 
issue in Indonesia.
The influence of increased public awareness 
of corruption issues could have several potential 
outcomes. On the positive side, it may spur local-
ly-based campaigns, attendance at anti-corruption 
rallies, the signing of petitions, donating funds to 
or volunteering for anti-corruption organisations 
and other expressions of solidarity with the anti-
corruption cause. However, increased awareness 
has not automatically produced such outcomes in 
Indonesia. Anti-corruption rallies remain the bas-
tion of NGOs and student groups, failing to ap-
peal to a broad cross-section of Indonesian soci-
ety. Donations from the public to anti-corruption 
NGOs also remain low, with organisations such as 
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) assembling 
‘mobile marketing’ teams to sign up individuals 
as regular donors in an attempt to subsidise their 
69  WHEN NEWS BECOMES ENTERTAINMENT
regular funding.
The nature of media reporting on corruption 
has raised a number of concerns about how peo-
ple perceive the issue of corruption and has con-
sequences for overall public attitudes towards the 
issue. Assuming that there is no such thing as ‘bad 
publicity’ in the case of raising awareness about 
corruption issues contradicts observations of how 
anti-corruption sentiment plays out on the ground 
in Indonesia. There is concern that the scandalised 
nature of reporting is fostering interest towards 
corruption that is based on intrigue and entertain-
ment rather than on consideration of corruption 
as a serious political topic.16 Corruption cases, 
particularly those discussed in the previous sec-
tion, attract public attention because of their dra-
ma, rather than their reflection of a system that is 
not functioning as it should; they are soap-operas 
rather than a serious indictment of a dysfunctional 
political system. Moreover, the over-arching inter-
est in hair styles, fashion and relationships (Amir-
uddin, 2012) is testimony to the fact that corrup-
tion reports sometimes tend to focus on aspects 
that are unrelated to the crime itself.
In diverting the focus of these cases from the 
crimes to unrelated aspects of the personality or 
appearance of the accused, the portrayals stop 
highlighting the detrimental aspects of the crime 
for the wider public. Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur 
(1976, p. 17) contend that media messages not 
linked to an individual’s social reality may have lit-
tle effect on altering their behaviour. Scandalised 
depictions of cases which fail to relate cases back 
to the reality of regular people, or put forward a 
sense of how these cases have real impacts for the 
public, are thus unlikely to change the behaviour 
of the general public who are not already involved 
in the anti-corruption movement.
A second concern is that the extensive cover-
age of corruption cases in the media is leading to 
perceptions of the anti-corruption movement as 
being ineffective. In a study on the impact of nega-
tive reporting about unions and its correlation to 
public support for the union movement, Schmidt 
(1993) concluded that media coverage that high-
light the negative aspects of the union movement, 
namely strikes, led to a decrease in public support 
among non-union members. Similarly, those who 
are not already involved in the anti-corruption 
movement may feel less inclined to take action as 
a result of incessant media reporting, which rarely 
reports successes. The cases, particularly if they 
are not resolved in a timely manner, contribute 
to the sentiment that the fight against corruption 
is an ‘unwinnable’ war and thus not worth the 
investment of personal time. In reporting all the 
obstacles facing the investigation and prosecution 
of corruption cases in meticulous and unrelenting 
details, the media does nothing to help overcome 
the impression that corruption is an entrenched 
part of Indonesia’s political culture, and that even 
professionals tasked with overcoming the prob-
lem are struggling to do so. The increased apathy 
towards corruption issues will do little to boost 
public interest or support for the anti-corruption 
movement, even if the progress made by the anti-
corruption movement is admirable given the sheer 
size of the task.
Conclusion
The media is crucial in shaping public discourse 
and attitudes towards political issues. As the In-
donesian media is now able to report openly and 
freely on corruption, dissecting and understand-
ing the impact of this coverage takes on a new 
importance. This paper has analysed some of the 
trends in the Indonesian media coverage, drawing 
upon reports on three major corruption scandals 
between 2011 and 2012. The Indonesian media 
appears to be reporting on corruption with vigour, 
enthusiastically covering scandals to the point that 
the problem saturates publications and television 
programming. This, in itself, is not a bad thing, as 
these reports serve to inform and educate people 
about events and actions in the political arena, 
providing them with access to information that 
they might not otherwise have.
The concern, however, lies in the depiction 
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of the stories. The dominant ‘politics-as-enter-
tainment’ format, with its focus on characters 
and intrigues, encourages a cosmetic interest and 
a superficial understanding of corruption issues 
facing the Indonesian government. This, in turn, 
leads to a diminished quality of political discourse 
in which “political arguments are trivialized, ap-
pearances matter more than reality, personalities 
more than policies, the superficial more than the 
profound” (Street, 2001, p. 185). Moreover, it un-
dermines optimism in the anti-corruption cause 
and discourages people from investing time in a 
cause that they see as an unwinnable war. With its 
key democratic role as the fourth estate, the me-
dia has a responsibility to inform citizens in a way 
that not only provides oversight, but also fosters 
meaningful debate about issues facing the state. In 
this way, the framing of corruption scandals as en-
tertainment in Indonesia poses a risk to the anti-
corruption movement, encouraging interest but 
not necessarily meaningful action.
Notes
1. Personal communication with Dr Meuthia 
Rachman, Professor of Sociology at Univer-
sitas Indonesia (17 January 2012); J. Danang 
Widoyoko, Director at Indonesian Corruption 
Watch (20 January 2012); and Ignatius Hary-
anto, Director of the Centre for Press Develop-
ment in Jakarta (3 February 2012).
2. As Schultz (1998, p. 1) notes, the term ‘fourth 
estate’ has become so popular that it contin-
ues to be used even though “most people have 
forgotten—if they ever knew—what the first, 
second and third estates were”.
3. Elite capture and media bias do not inevita-
bly lead to negative impacts for the citizenry. 
Corneo (2006, p. 39) asserts that a biased 
media has the scope to improve the political 
equilibrium if there are distortions in report-
ing across the media sector as a whole. How-
ever, Corneo also argues that while such an 
outcome is possible, the general tendency is 
for elite capture to be targeted at manipulat-
ing public opinion in a way that overwhelm-
ingly benefits the interests of the elite who 
own the media.
4. For further reading on the issue of media own-
ership and its impacts in Indonesia, see Tapsell 
(2010).
5. One commonly cited example of this scenario 
is the Watergate scandal in the early 1970s, in 
which American President Nixon was ultimate-
ly forced to resign over links to an attempt to 
break into the Democratic National Committee 
headquarters. The outcome of this case is seen 
as an example of the triumph of investigative 
journalism in holding public officials to account 
(Heidenheimer et al., 1990, p. 6).
6. For a useful discussion of the impacts of com-
mercialisation of media upon public account-
ability, see Habermas’ seminal work, The 
structural transformation of the public sphere 
(1989). Habermas contends that the rise of the 
media has led to the commodification of in-
formation and opinion, and that the media no 
longer serves the public good, but instead aims 
to influence consumers in the private sphere.
7. While there is little investigation into the exact 
financial gain related to the reporting of scan-
dals within Indonesia, studies into the Clinton-
Lewinsky scandal in the United States have dem-
onstrated that television stations, particularly 
24-hours cable news channels, generated huge 
increases in audience and revenues as a result of 
coverage (Tumber & Waisbord, 2004, p. 1147).
8. I thank Ignatius Haryanto for his insight in this 
respect and credit him with sharing with me 
his concept of ‘the reporting of banalities’ in 
the Indonesian media (personal communica-
tion, 3 February 2012).
9. Corruption issues were commonly discussed 
in the media in the years leading up to 1965, 
though little academic work has been pub-
lished on this topic. One rare example of his-
torical reporting on corruption in Indonesia is 
a recent edition of Indonesian language maga-
zine Historia (2012), which published a collec-
tion of articles on prominent corruption cases 
during the 1950s.
10. This is not to suggest that no other cases have 
been the target of media coverage. What sets 
these cases apart, however, is prevalence, con-
sistency and the breadth of coverage.
11. For a complete account of the Bank Century 
case through to 2011, see Soesatyo (2012, pp. 
131–174). Soesatyo is connected with the Gol-
kar political party and this may influence some 
of the conclusion he presents, but the facts of 
the case (as they were known at the time of pub-
lication) are presented clearly and concisely.
12. Some examples of coverage include Tempo’s 
article ‘Seperti apa rumah mewah nunun di 
Bangkok?’ (Tempo Interaktif, 19 December 
2011) and a piece in the Jakarta Globe (27 De-
cember 2011) that described Nunun as having 
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been on “a nine-month shopping spree in Sin-
gapore and Thailand”.
13. Angelina Sondakh was crowned Miss Indone-
sia in 2001. Her late husband, also an MP, died 
suddenly of a heart attack in February 2011, 
leaving her widowed with one child and two 
stepchildren.
14. Examples of coverage include articles on 
memory loss such as: ‘Nunun’s memory fine, 
but not her ankle: Golkar’ (The Jakarta Globe, 
16 June 2011), ‘Nunun questioning will prove 
truth about memory loss: KPK’ (The Jakarta 
Post, 20 December 2011) and ‘Memahami otak 
Nunun Nurbaeti’ [Understanding the brain of 
Nunun Nurbaeti] (Kompas.com, 18 July 2011).
15. For examples of coverage, see ‘Hatta rajasa 
bantah ada rapat century di istana presiden’ 
(Berita Satu, 13 August 2012 ) and ‘Denny In-
drayana: Antasari Azhar berbohong’ (Tempo.
com, 10 August 2012).
16. I would like to thank writer and activist Har-
tono Sutejo for our discussion and his insights 
in this respect (personal communication, 19 
January 2012).
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